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ADVOCACY IN THE MEDIA:
THE BLAGOJEVICH DEFENSE AND
A REFORMULATION OF RULE 3.6
LEIGH A. KRAHENBUHL †
ABSTRACT
The current ethical rule governing lawyers’ interactions with the
media applies equally to defense attorneys and prosecutors despite
their different roles and responsibilities in the justice system. With a
focus on the Blagojevich trial as an example of modern lawyers’
interactions with the press, this Note argues for a separate rule
governing defense lawyers’ extrajudicial speech. Such a rule would
recognize an interest in protecting the legitimacy of the justice system
and would provide clear standards to guide defense lawyers’
advocacy outside of the courtroom. This Note provides an overview
of the development of the trial-publicity rules, a glimpse of the media
coverage of the Blagojevich trial, and a proposed rule to guide
defense lawyers’ extrajudicial advocacy.

INTRODUCTION
In the midst of a press conference announcing former Illinois
Governor Rod Blagojevich’s indictment on conspiracy and bribery
charges, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois Patrick
Fitzgerald accused Blagojevich of engaging in conduct that “would
1
make Lincoln roll over in his grave.” This press conference was the
first drop in a sea of media coverage that would surround the events
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leading up to and during the former governor’s trial. After
Fitzgerald’s public announcement, the Blagojevich defense team
became a common presence on the evening news in Chicago, and the
lawyers made no attempt to hide their defense strategy from the
3
public and potential jurors. Although lawyers’ advocacy in the media
is nothing new, the Blagojevich defense team brought a new level of
4
flamboyance to the court of public opinion.
For more than forty years, committees of lawyers and judges
have worked to develop sensible, modern guidelines for lawyers’
interactions with the media, struggling to balance the right to a fair
5
trial with the right of free expression. These rules have been
designed to keep a jury focused on what occurs in the courtroom
when rendering a verdict by reducing the potential for outside
6
influences on the jurors. The modern rule on trial publicity has gone
7
through at least three major revisions and, even in its current form,
8
has received plenty of criticism from commentators.
9
The current rule, which applies to prosecutors and defense
lawyers alike, does not explicitly address defense lawyers’

2. A number of Chicago news outlets created blogs and webpages specific to the
Blagojevich trial as a part of their coverage. See, e.g., CHI. SUN-TIMES BLAGO BLOG, http://
blogs.suntimes.com/blago (last visited Sept. 5, 2011); CHI. TRIB. BLAGOJEVICH ON TRIAL
BLOG, http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/blagojevich-on-trial (last visited Sept. 5, 2011);
Blagojevich Trial, WGNTV.COM, http://www.wgntv.com/news/blagojevich (last visited Sept. 5,
2011); Blagojevich Trial Coverage, ABC7 NEWS, http://abclocal.go.com/wls/channel?section=
news/politics&id=7159461 (last visited Sept. 5, 2011); Rod Blagojevich Coverage, FOX CHI.
NEWS, http://www.myfoxchicago.com/generic/news/rod-blagojevich (last visited Sept. 5, 2011).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 95–100.
4. See Bryan Smith, Mighty Mouth, CHICAGO, June 2010, at 70, 73 (“Adam Jr. has been
the public face of the defense. And, true to form, his over-the-top appearances have been
eclipsed only by the bombast and unrestrained theatricality of Blagojevich himself.”).
5. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 1 (2010) (“It is difficult to strike a
balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free
expression.”); see also Paul C. Reardon, The Fair Trial–Free Press Standards, 54 A.B.A. J. 343,
345 (1968) (“The report of the advisory committee was, in essence, an attempt to establish
reasonable guides for professional conduct with no interference with constitutional guarantees
of press freedoms.”).
6. John C. Watson, Litigation Public Relations: The Lawyers’ Duty To Balance News
Coverage of Their Clients, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 77, 91 (2002).
7. STEPHEN GILLERS, ROY D. SIMON & ANDREW M. PERLMAN, REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 271–76 (concise ed. 2010); see also infra Part I.
8. See e.g., infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
9. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6.
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extrajudicial advocacy. This lack of clearly defined restrictions on
extrajudicial speech allows lawyers like the Blagojevich defense team
to push the limits of the rule through their statements to the media
11
without any serious repercussions. Other lawyers, concerned with
violating the rules, have responded to the lack of guidance by
12
remaining silent. To address this problem, the focus of the rule
should be reevaluated to account for the different interests in
restricting prosecutors’ and defense lawyers’ speech, and the structure
of the rule and its limitations should reflect those interests. Such a
reform would provide more guidance for attorneys in determining
when it is appropriate to talk to the media and would allow
disciplinary authorities to enforce the rule when lawyers cross the
line.
This Note proposes that the American Bar Association (ABA)
develop a separate rule for defense lawyers in the realm of trial
publicity that accounts for the different purposes for restricting their
speech and that takes into account the proper allowances or
13
limitations on extrajudicial advocacy. Part I provides an overview of
the history and development of trial-publicity rules. Part II looks to
the Blagojevich case as an example of lawyers’ current interactions
with the media in high-profile cases and discusses the rule’s
shortcomings. Part III addresses the importance of having a workable
rule and explains the rationale behind the separation of rules for
prosecutors and defense lawyers. It then proposes potential
guidelines that would allow defense lawyers to advocate in the court
of public opinion, but that would also limit this advocacy in a way that
would ensure the effective representation of clients and the
legitimacy of the legal profession as a whole.

10. See id. R. 3.6 cmt. 1 (listing several “vital social interests served by the free
dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal
proceedings themselves” but omitting any reference to a lawyer’s advocacy for his client).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 164–166.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 167–171.
13. Although this Note will address the current trial-publicity rule as it applies to both
prosecutors and defense attorneys, the suggested changes in the rule will focus on defense
attorneys’ extrajudicial advocacy. Because the current rule seems to be geared more toward
prosecutor speech, a new, separate rule should be developed to provide clear guidelines for
defense attorneys. The current Rule 3.6 would remain a rule that applies to prosecutors only.
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRIAL-PUBLICITY RULES
A. History of the Regulation of Trial Publicity
The ABA’s first attempt at restricting extrajudicial speech came
long before the influx of modern media. In 1908, the ABA issued
Canon 20 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, which significantly
14
limited a lawyer’s interactions with the press. The Canon expressed
the ABA’s view that lawyers should generally refrain from making
15
16
extrajudicial public statements, even in extreme cases. If a lawyer
found it absolutely necessary to comment publicly, the Canon
declared that the lawyer “should not go beyond quotation from the
17
records and papers on file in the Court.” Despite its strict language,
18
the standard was not actually mandatory. The lack of enforceability
was likely due in part to a concern that such a rule would risk
19
infringing on lawyers’ First Amendment rights.
1. Sheppard v. Maxwell. Nearly sixty years after the creation of
Canon 20, the Supreme Court acknowledged in dicta the potential for
20
a constitutional rule restricting lawyer speech. A jury found Dr. Sam

14. Canon 20 provided that:
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may
interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration
of justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a
particular case justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it
anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from
the records and papers on file in the Court; but even in extreme cases it is better to
avoid any ex parte statement.
CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 20 (1908).
15. Like the trial-publicity rules, this Note frequently references lawyers’ extrajudicial
statements. The concern, however, is not with all statements made outside the courtroom.
Instead, the references to extrajudicial statements are in regard to statements made outside the
courtroom that the lawyer knows or should know will be transmitted to the public through some
form of media.
16. See CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 20 (“[E]ven in extreme cases it is better to
avoid any ex parte statement.”).
17. Id.
18. See Gabriel G. Gregg, ABA Rule 3.6 and California Rule 5-120: A Flawed Approach to
the Problem of Trial Publicity, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1331–32 (1996) (explaining that Canon
20 “was simply a guideline and not punishable by state bars”); Reardon, supra note 5, at 344
(“In our judgment, the canon was not sufficiently explicit and lacked muscle.”).
19. Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., “May It Please the Camera, . . . I Mean the Court”—An
Intrajudicial Solution to an Extrajudicial Problem, 39 GA. L. REV. 83, 95–96 (2004).
20. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (“Collaboration between counsel
and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to
regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.”); see also Watson,
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Sheppard guilty for the murder of his wife in 1954, and Sheppard’s
21
habeas corpus petition reached the Supreme Court in 1965.
Sheppard argued that he had not received a fair trial because of the
“massive, pervasive and prejudicial publicity” that surrounded the
22
litigation. Overturning Sheppard’s conviction, the Court noted the
increasing prevalence of “unfair and prejudicial news comment on
pending trials” and emphasized the need for further regulation in the
23
24
realm of trial publicity. Although the Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell
focused on the “carnival atmosphere at trial” rather than statements
made only by the attorneys in the case, it nevertheless emphasized
that the need for regulation came from a concern about the accused’s
25
right to a fair trial.
2. The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility:
DR 7-107. The Court’s dicta in Sheppard, together with the Warren
26
Commission Report and a general sense among the press and judges
that the profession needed more guidance in trial publicity, led to the
27
formation of a new rule to replace Canon 20. The Advisory
supra note 6, at 93 (explaining that during the years between the creation of Canon 20 and the
Sheppard case, “sensational and intrusive coverage of controversial trials was blamed for
contributing to public hysteria and, in turn, producing unfair trials”).
21. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 335 & n.1.
22. Id. at 335.
23. Id. at 362–63. The Court noted that it was the trial courts’ responsibility to ensure a
defendant’s right to a fair trial through the creation of rules and regulations. Id. Although the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct now provide guidelines for lawyers’ comments to the
media, the Model Rules are not binding on their own. GILLERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 3.
Courts still adopt their own rules, and states have their own disciplinary systems. Sheppard, 384
U.S. at 363. The Model Rules simply provide a comprehensive set of guidelines, which most
states follow closely. GILLERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 3. For a selection of state variations on
the current trial-publicity rule, see id. at 276–78.
24. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
25. Id. at 358, 362. The Court made clear that the trial judge should have instated rules to
control both the press and “the release of leads, information, and gossip to the press by police
officers, witnesses, and the counsel for both sides.” Id. at 358–59. It did, however, note that if
there was a continued likelihood that publicity could threaten the defendant’s right to a fair
trial, the judge could have transferred the case or sequestered the jury. Id. at 363.
26. The Warren Commission’s purpose was to investigate the assassination of President
Kennedy. ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 61:1008 (2011). As a
part of its report, the commission encouraged representatives of the bar to work with law
enforcement and news media to develop “ethical standards concerning the collection and
presentation of information to the public so that there will be no interference with pending
criminal investigations, court proceedings, or the right of individuals to a fair trial.” Id. In
response, the ABA established the Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press in 1964,
chaired by Paul Reardon. Reardon, supra note 5, at 343.
27. Reardon, supra note 5, at 343–44.

KRAHENBUHL IN FINAL

172

10/6/2011 6:50:46 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:167

Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press released a final draft in
28
1968. In its report, the committee focused on creating a set of
narrowly tailored guidelines and limitations to protect a criminal
defendant’s right to a fair trial without upsetting the First
29
Amendment. The committee’s recommendations were incorporated
into the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility as DR 730
107. These guidelines alleviated some of the concerns about the lack
of specificity and enforceability present in Canon 20, but the overall
31
restrictive nature of the standard remained.
3. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer. The Seventh Circuit
reviewed Illinois’s version of DR 7-107 in Chicago Council of
32
Lawyers v. Bauer. Just as Sheppard questioned the continued
effectiveness of Canon 20 and prompted a new trial-publicity
standard, the decision in Bauer questioned the continued validity of
33
DR 7-107. In determining that the reasonable-likelihood-ofprejudice standard in DR 7-107 was overbroad, the court emphasized
that all First Amendment restrictions must be narrowly tailored to the
34
state’s legitimate interest. The court held that the rule swept too
35
broadly and could lead to the prohibition of harmless statements.
Suggesting the inclusion of a serious-and-imminent-threat standard,
the court added that “[l]awyers must be aware of exactly what areas

28. ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL & FREE PRESS, ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS
RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (1968). The
committee’s report is often referred to as the Reardon Report after the committee’s chairman.
29. See Reardon, supra note 5, at 344 (“In short, we have recommended new language that
states the duty of a lawyer to refrain from disseminating information or opinion reasonably
likely to interfere with a pending or imminent criminal trial with which he is associated or with a
grand jury or other pending investigation.”). The committee also reiterated that the focus of the
conflict in extrajudicial speech is the tension between a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a
fair trial and the First Amendment right to free speech, both of which have been considered
independently to be the most fundamental of all constitutional rights. Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr.,
Fair Trial–Free Press, 45 F.R.D. 417, 418 (1968).
30. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 note 85 (1980); see also Brown,
supra note 19, at 98 (noting that the committee’s report includes the “reasonable likelihood” of
preventing a fair trial standard, which the Sheppard Court suggested would be the appropriate
standard).
31. Brown, supra note 19, at 98–100.
32. Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975).
33. See id. at 251 (finding that DR 7-107, among other rules, was “constitutionally infirm”
because it “fail[ed] to specifically incorporate within each provision the serious and imminent
threat standard”).
34. Id. at 249.
35. Id. at 251.
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
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of speech might pose a serious and imminent threat of interference
36
with a fair trial.”
B. Development of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Shortly after the Bauer decision, the ABA established the
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards to
comprehensively rethink the existing Model Code of Professional
37
Responsibility. Instead of revising the existing Model Code, the
commission proposed the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as a
38
replacement, including Rule 3.6, which addressed trial publicity. As
adopted in 1983, Rule 3.6 disallowed the making of any statements
that a reasonable lawyer knows or should know would “have a
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
39
proceeding.” The rule also listed the types of statements likely to
prejudice a proceeding and those that a lawyer could usually make
40
without fear of violating the rule. In a comment accompanying the
final draft of the proposed Rule 3.6, the commission noted the
difficulty in striking a balance between a defendant’s right to a fair
trial and an attorney’s right of free expression, and it acknowledged
that no set of rules would be able to satisfy the multiple competing
41
interests.

36. Id.
37. Robert J. Kutak, Chairman’s Introduction to MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, at i,
i (Proposed Final Draft 1981); see also ABA COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF PROF’L
STANDARDS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1 (1982) (“The objective of the project
was to produce rules of professional conduct that preserve fundamental values while providing
realistic, useful guidance for lawyer conduct in an environment that finds the profession and the
practice of law, like American society itself, undergoing significant change.”).
38. ABA COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF PROF’L STANDARDS, supra note 37, at 72–73.
39. Id. at 72.
40. Id. at 72–73. For example, the rule specified that a statement is likely to lead to material
prejudice when, inter alia, it refers to a criminal matter and relates to “the character, credibility,
reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the
identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness,” or “information the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and
would if disclosed create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial.” Id. The rule also
included as subsection (b) a provision allowing “[a] lawyer involved in the investigation or
litigation of a matter [to] state without elaboration . . . the general nature of the claim or
defense,” public information, and other basic facts. Id.
41. See id. at 73 (“No body of rules can simultaneously satisfy all interests of fair trial and
all those of free expression.”). As a part of the 1994 amendments to the rule, the committee
removed this comment. ABA STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY &
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 3 (1994).
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The commission determined that the rule should apply equally to
prosecutors and defense attorneys, without any explicit
42
differentiation between the two. Although the drafters of Rule 3.6
did not clarify why they chose not to enumerate separate guidelines,
they defended the application of the general rule to both prosecutors
43
and defense lawyers after courts and commentators argued that the
limitations on extrajudicial speech should apply only to the
44
prosecution. These arguments focused on the idea that the
restrictions on pretrial publicity are meant to safeguard a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, a right that is not jeopardized
45
by the defense counsel’s interactions with the media. Responding to
this argument, the drafters explained that the state’s interest in the
limitations could be construed as a more general concern about the
fair administration of justice, rather than protecting the specific right
46
of a defendant.

42. See ABA COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF PROF’L STANDARDS, supra note 37, at 72 (“A
lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.”
(emphasis added)). The rule also applies to lawyers involved in a civil case, but this Note focuses
solely on the rule as it applies to defense attorneys and prosecutors. Much as this Note will
argue that the rule should provide separate guidelines for defense attorneys and prosecutors, it
would also be wise to reevaluate the guidelines for lawyers involved in civil litigation. See
WILLIAM H. FORTUNE, RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, MODERN
LITIGATION AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HANDBOOK: THE LIMITS OF ZEALOUS
ADVOCACY § 7.2.4, at 312 (2d ed. 2001) (“While Model Rule 3.6 applies to all ‘adjudicative
proceedings,’ the courts’ primary concern has been with extrajudicial statements in criminal
cases. Civil cases take longer to reach trial, are usually less highly charged, and do not implicate
the right to an impartial jury under the sixth amendment.”).
43. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 notes at 148 (Proposed Final Draft
1981) (explaining the application of the rule to both prosecutors and defense counsel, rather
than to prosecutors alone).
44. Id.
45. Id.; CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 635 n.5 (1986); see also Chi.
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 253 (7th Cir. 1975) (“The possibility of prejudice to
the Government’s case, which has not even been presented by indictment or information, is too
remote in view of the countervailing interests to justify these restrictions on nonprosecution
attorneys.”); Monroe H. Freedman & Janet Starwood, Prior Restraints on Freedom of
Expression by Defendants and Defense Attorneys: Ratio Decidendi v. Obiter Dictum, 29 STAN.
L. REV. 607, 607–08 (1977) (arguing that concerns about publicity generated by the defense are
misguided because the Constitution guarantees “protecting the individual from the state, not
the reverse”).
46. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 notes at 148 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
It is not clear what the drafters meant by a general concern about the “fair administration of
justice.” Although the committee stated that it intended to protect more than the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, it did not explain the explicit nature of those interests. Id.
For more on the state interest in the rule, see infra Part II.C.2.
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C. Challenging the Validity of the Rule: Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada
The new ABA standard loosened the restrictions on lawyer
speech but did not eliminate doubts about the rule’s constitutional
47
validity. The new rule faced its first major revision in 1994 following
48
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada. In
Gentile, a criminal-defense attorney challenged the constitutionality
of Nevada’s trial-publicity rule, which was almost identical to Rule
49
3.6. The Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board of the State Bar had
recommended that Gentile face private reprimand for statements he
had made during a press conference six months before his client’s
trial, in which he argued that the police, rather than his client, had
been responsible for the theft of $300,000 worth of drugs from a
50
storage facility. Gentile appealed the decision to the Nevada
51
Supreme Court, which affirmed the board’s judgment. In a decision
with two majority opinions, the Supreme Court held that Nevada’s
52
rule was unconstitutional. Justice O’Connor joined parts III and VI
53
of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, giving those parts five votes. There,
54
the Court held that the rule was unconstitutionally vague.
Specifically, the Kennedy majority recognized that the rule’s safe55
harbor provision “misled [Gentile] into thinking that he could give
56
his press conference without fear of discipline.”

47. See Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor, the Press, and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM
L. REV. 865, 931 (1990) (suggesting that “provisions remain in Model Rule 3.6 that are open to
vagueness and overbreadth questions”).
48. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
49. Id. at 1033 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1033–34.
53. Id. at 1082 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justices Thurgood Marshall, Harry A.
Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens joined with Justices Kennedy and O’Connor to form the
majority for parts III and VI of Justice Kennedy’s opinion.
54. Id. at 1048 (majority opinion of Kennedy, J.).
55. This provision aligned with subsection (b) of Rule 3.6, which provided a number of
things a lawyer could state “without elaboration.” Id.; ABA COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF
PROF’L STANDARDS, supra note 37, at 72–73.
56. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048 (majority opinion of Kennedy, J.). The Court seemed
particularly concerned with the language of the rule that allowed lawyers to state the “general
nature of the . . . defense.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting ABA COMM’N ON EVALUATION
OF PROF’L STANDARDS, supra note 37, at 72). This language provides insufficient guidance to
lawyers hoping to discuss a client’s defense: “The lawyer has no principle for determining when
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Justice O’Connor also joined parts I and II of Chief Justice
57
Rehnquist’s opinion, giving a fifth vote to those parts. The
Rehnquist majority held the rule’s “substantial likelihood of material
58
prejudice” standard to be constitutional. The Court determined that
lawyers’ speech could be restricted in this way in part because lawyers
are “key participants in the criminal justice system” and have
additional responsibilities to protect the fairness and integrity of the
59
judiciary. Rehnquist held that the standard was sufficiently narrow
and only limited lawyers’ speech to the extent necessary to protect
60
the state’s interest.
Alternatively, in the portion of his opinion that received only
four votes, Justice Kennedy argued that lawyers have a duty to their
clients outside the courtroom, which sometimes necessitates making
statements to the media to defend a client’s reputation or responding
61
to comments from the prosecution. Although Kennedy argued that
the rule imposed a greater-than-necessary limitation on a lawyer’s
First Amendment freedoms, he also noted that the case was “a poor
vehicle for defining with precision the outer limits under the

his remarks pass from the safe harbor of the general to the forbidden sea of the elaborated.” Id.
at 1049.
57. Id. at 1082 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justices Byron R. White, Antonin Scalia, and
David H. Souter joined with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor to form the majority
of the court for parts I and II of Rehnquist’s opinion.
58. Id. at 1075 (majority opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
59. See id. at 1074–75 (“Because lawyers have special access to information through
discovery and client communications, their extrajudicial statements pose a threat to the fairness
of a pending proceeding since lawyers’ statements are likely to be received as especially
authoritative.”).
60. Id. at 1075. Both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor justified their positions
by recognizing that lawyers are “officers of the court.” Id.; id. at 1081–82 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). Rehnquist noted that the state’s interest in protecting the integrity and fairness of
the judicial system requires a less demanding standard. Id. at 1075 (majority opinion of
Rehnquist, C.J.). Rehnquist did not make clear whether he was referring to the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial or a more general interest in the overall integrity of the
system but did note that “[f]ew, if any, interests under the Constitution are more fundamental
than the right to a fair trial by ‘impartial’ jurors, and an outcome affected by extrajudicial
statements would violate that fundamental right.” Id.
61. Id. at 1043 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (“An attorney’s duties do not begin inside the
courtroom door. He or she cannot ignore the practical implications of a legal proceeding for the
client. . . . [A]n attorney may take reasonable steps to defend a client’s reputation and reduce
the adverse consequences of indictment, especially in the face of a prosecution deemed unjust
or commenced with improper motives.”).
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Constitution of a court’s ability to regulate an attorney’s statements
62
about ongoing adjudicative proceedings.”
In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility reviewed the
continued validity and effectiveness of Rule 3.6 and suggested three
63
substantial changes. First, responding to the Gentile Court’s concern
about the vagueness of the rule, the committee proposed minor
changes to the wording of several of the safe-harbor statements in
subsection (c) and proposed moving the rule’s provisions outlining
specific statements that were likely to cause prejudice to the
64
commentary. Next, the committee proposed the addition of a right65
of-reply provision. This provision, now included as Rule 3.6(c),
allows “a lawyer to respond where adverse publicity has been
initiated by an opposing party or third persons, in order to avoid
66
substantial undue prejudice to the lawyer’s client.” Finally, the
committee suggested that a new subsection be added to the current
67
Rule 3.8, which includes special rules for prosecutors. This provision
would prohibit unnecessary comments likely to increase public
68
criticism of the accused. The ABA House of Delegates approved the
69
recommendations of the committee in August of 1994.

62. Id. at 1057–58. One of the reasons Justice Kennedy thought this case did not provide a
good occasion for defining an appropriate standard of scrutiny for extrajudicial speech was that
it involved a criminal defense lawyer and not a prosecutor. Id. at 1055. Whereas Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that the rule applies equally to all lawyers, id. at 1076 (majority opinion of
Rehnquist, C.J.), Kennedy argued that “[t]he various bar association and advisory commission
reports which resulted in promulgation of ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6, and
other regulations of attorney speech, and sources they cite, present no convincing case for
restrictions upon the speech of defense attorneys,” id. at 1055 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (citation
omitted).
63. ABA STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY & ABA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 41, at 7.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 8.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. This new subsection now appears in MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f)
(2010). Although it is not clear from the committee report, this addition may have been in
response to Justice Kennedy’s argument in Gentile, in which he distinguished criminal defense
lawyers from prosecutors. See supra note 62.
69. GILLERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 274.
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Throughout the course of the development of the ABA’s ethical
rules, commentators have criticized them as an ineffective approach
70
to dealing with the trial-publicity problem. This sentiment has also
71
been reflected in the courts. The added “right of reply” in Rule
72
3.6(c) and the continued ambiguity in the rule’s language and
73
purpose following the 1994 amendments have left lawyers with little
guidance in determining how much they can or should say to the
74
media. Without the necessary level of clarity and a proper focus, the
rule provides little force for effectively restricting lawyers’ speech.

70. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence Is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under
the First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859, 884–85 (1998) (“The [Model Rules’] inherent
vagueness and uncertainty is virtually certain to chill speech.”); Gregg, supra note 18, at 1361
(“In essence, broadly applicable disciplinary rules such as these create more problems than their
limited value as a control on lawyers’ speech warrants.”).
71. See Gregg, supra note 18, at 1323 (“Indeed, every major trial publicity rule introduced
before 1994 has been invalidated by some court as overly restrictive of lawyers’ First
Amendment rights.”).
72. Rule 3.6(c) provides:
Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable
lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue
prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer’s client.
A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as
is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(c). The addition of Rule 3.6(c) may have signified
the rule writers’ recognition that talking to the media at times plays a role in lawyers’ zealous
representation of their clients. See id. R. 3.6 cmt. 7 (“When prejudicial statements have been
publicly made by others, responsive statements may have the salutary effect of lessening any
resulting adverse impact on the adjudicative proceeding.”). It is not clear, however, what may be
viewed as “necessary” to mitigate the effects of adverse publicity and at what point a lawyer’s
responsive statements would become unnecessary. It may be the case that, in practice, Rule
3.6(c) provides no meaningful limitation on lawyers’ extrajudicial speech so long as it is
responding to recent adverse publicity. See Brown, supra note 19, at 111 (“[O]ne might
reasonably question whether . . . the door for responsive extrajudicial statements is ever truly
closed in [high-profile] cases.”). For more on the limitations on the scope of the right of reply,
see infra Part II.C.1.
73. Brown, supra note 19, at 90–91 (“Rule 3.6 is rife with qualifiers and ambiguities that
render it difficult, if not impossible, to enforce meaningfully.”). Professor Brown also asserts
that limitations on prosecutors’ extrajudicial speech in Rule 3.8(f) are “equally as vague and
difficult to enforce as Rule 3.6.” Id. at 91.
74. See James R. Devine, The Duke Lacrosse Matter as a Case Study of the Right To Reply
to Prejudicial Pretrial Extrajudicial Publicity Under Rule 3.6(c), 15 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
175, 210, 223 (2008) (questioning the limits of Rule 3.6(c) but noting that there must be some
limitation).
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II. THE WEAKNESSES OF THE CURRENT RULE
The added right of reply in Rule 3.6(c) is perhaps an indication
that the ABA is prepared to recognize that advocacy may properly
75
reach beyond courtroom doors. But the rule’s remaining ambiguity
is more likely to lead to confusion than successful advocacy. This Part
begins with a discussion of the Blagojevich trial as an example of
defense lawyers’ representation of a client in the media and illustrates
the different motivations for prosecution and defense attorneys to
engage in extrajudicial speech. Finally, this Part uses the press
coverage of the Blagojevich case to illuminate the rule’s lack of clarity
and misguided purpose and to attempt to discover the ultimate source
of confusion.
A. Blagojevich Trial: Advocacy in the Media
1. Pretrial Statements. On December 9, 2008, Patrick Fitzgerald,
the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, addressed the
76
press on what he called “a very sad day for Illinois government.”
Fitzgerald’s press conference was the first official announcement of
the complaint accusing then-Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich of
77
conspiracy and bribery. Fitzgerald said Blagojevich had been
78
arrested in an attempt to stop “a political corruption crime spree.”
The “most appalling” allegation in the complaint was that
Blagojevich had attempted to sell the Senate seat vacated by Barack
79
Obama after his election to the White House. Fitzgerald told the
media that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had placed a
wiretap on Blagojevich’s home phone and that the tapes from that
80
interception would expose Blagojevich’s attempt to sell the seat. He
then quoted the governor as saying that the Senate seat is “a bleeping
valuable thing . . . . You just don’t give it away for nothing. . . . I’ve
got this thing, and it’s bleeping golden. And I’m just not giving it up

75. See Watson, supra note 6, at 98 (arguing that the right-of-reply revision indicates that
the ABA is “recognizing the outside forum as a proper arena where the attorneys’ duty to
zealously defend their clients remains paramount”).
76. Patrick Fitzgerald, U.S. Att’y for the N. Dist. of Ill., & Robert Grant, Special Agent,
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Justice Department Briefing on Blagojevich Investigation (Dec. 9,
2008) (transcript available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/09/us/politics/09text-illinois.html).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. SEIGEL & KELLEY, supra note 1, at 48.
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81

for bleeping nothing.” Fitzgerald described the governor’s actions as
taking the state of Illinois “to a truly new low,” and remarked that
82
Blagojevich’s conduct “would make Lincoln roll over in his grave.”
The latter statement made for a sensational headline, but
commentators quickly questioned whether Fitzgerald had gone too
83
far.
The defense team first appeared in front of cameras and
84
reporters on Blagojevich’s behalf on December 19, 2008. After
Blagojevich denied the accusations against him, attorneys Sam Adam

81. Fitzgerald & Grant, supra note 76. Fitzgerald specified that “the bleeps are not really
bleeps” and that the quotes were “his words, not our characterization, other than with regard to
the bleep.” Id.
82. Id.
83. See Helen Gunnarsson, Did Pat Fitzgerald Say Too Much?, 97 ILL. B.J. 116, 116 (2009)
(“Fitzgerald’s statements garnered considerable criticism after viewers in the legal world had
the chance to catch their breath.”); Kelly Selesnick, Current Development, Innocent Until
Proven Guilty: Will Patrick Fitzgerald’s Public Statements Prejudice Rod Blagojevich’s Trial?, 23
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 827, 828 (2010) (assessing whether Fitzgerald’s statements violated
Illinois’s version of Model Rules 3.6 and 3.8). Some lawyers felt that Fitzgerald’s statements
could upset Blagojevich’s right to a fair trial while others felt “that the prosecutor’s comments
were not only appropriate but necessary to explain the federal authorities’ actions to an
understandably curious public.” Gunnarsson, supra, at 117. In her assessment of whether
Fitzgerald’s statements had violated Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct 3.6 and 3.8(e), which
are fairly similar to Model Rules 3.6 and 3.8(f), Kelly Selesnick points out that the Illinois Rules
use a “serious and imminent threat” standard as opposed to the Model Rules’ “substantial
likelihood” standard. Selesnick, supra, at 832–33. She opined that for this reason, it is unlikely
Fitzgerald will be prosecuted for violating the Illinois Rules, even though he likely violated
Model Rules 3.6 and 3.8. Id. at 842.
This criticism of Fitzgerald’s statements is reminiscent of the commentary surrounding
former District Attorney Mike Nifong’s disbarment following the Duke lacrosse case in 2007. It
was in part Nifong’s personal characterization of the case that led to this sanction. One scholar
noted that “among Nifong’s more outlandish public comments were his characterization of the
rape as ‘totally abhorrent’ and ‘reprehensible’ [and] his analogizing the case to a ‘cross
burning.’” R. Michael Cassidy, The Prosecutor and the Press: Lessons (Not) Learned from the
Mike Nifong Debacle, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 67 (Autumn 2008). Because Nifong did
not challenge his disbarment on First Amendment grounds, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina had no opportunity “to clarify the precise contours” of the state’s version of Rule 3.6
as it “pertain[s] to public comments by elected prosecutors.” Id. at 69. The main difference
between Nifong and Fitzgerald in their positions as prosecutors is that Nifong’s position is an
elected one. It is perhaps the case that Rule 3.6, as it applies to prosecutors, is also in need of
clarification. This Note, however, engages primarily with the trial-publicity rule as it applies to
defense attorneys.
84. Susan Saulny & Monica Davey, ‘I Will Fight,’ Blagojevich Vows, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
2008, at A11.
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Jr. and Sheldon Sorosky took questions from the reporters. These
two members of what would later become Blagojevich’s seven-lawyer
defense team accused the prosecutors of taking a limited number of
87
Blagojevich’s statements out of context to create a negative image.
Adam Jr. said that “[w]hen those tapes come out—and they’re not
just 15-second snippets that an agent who sits down in an office
somewhere pulls out what he thinks is bad—you’re going to find out
88
the truth on these conversations.” These statements directly
rebutted the prosecutor’s allegations, but they were only a taste of
what the defense lawyers would offer the media.
On February 4, 2010, the government reindicted Blagojevich on
what Sorosky described as the “same false charges realleged under
89
different legal theories.” In response to the new indictment, Adam
Jr. held a press conference to defend his client. Addressing the nowinfamous FBI tapes, Adam Jr. raised his voice and again insisted that
the tapes, if played in their entirety, would reveal his client’s
90
91
innocence. “You guys are good, hard-working journalists,” he said.
“Why aren’t you demanding that these tapes get played? We
shouldn’t have a system here in which the government comes in and
tapes and you don’t get to the truth! That’s what we want here. The
92
truth!” One journalist called Adam Jr.’s press conference “a

85. Sam Adam Jr. is the son of “legendary” Chicago criminal defense attorney Sam Adam
Sr., who was also a part of Blagojevich’s defense team. R. Kelly Lawyers Hint They May Take
Blagojevich’s Case, ST. J.-REG. (Springfield, Ill.) (May 11, 2009, 01:06 PM), http://www.sj-r.com/
breaking/x1194166165/R-Kelly-lawyers-hint-may-take-Blagos-case. Having practiced law for
only eleven years, Adam Jr. has already developed a reputation for his performances inside and
outside of the courtroom. In 2008 Adam Jr. successfully obtained an acquittal for his client,
R&B singer R. Kelly, and during his closing argument in that case, he “yelled, whispered,
laughed and pounded on the jury box.” Id. In representing a man accused of murder whose wife
had been missing for twenty years, Adam Jr. came to the Chicago Criminal Courts Building
with a stack of “missing” posters he had designed specifically for news reporters and TV
cameras. Jeff Coen & Bob Secter, A Little Swagger in the Court, CHI. TRIB., June 2, 2010, § 1, at
1. The posters had a picture of the alleged victim; they were a prop that Adams Jr. made to
illustrate the fact that no one knew whether the woman had actually died. Id.
86. Saulny & Davey, supra note 84.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Jeff Coen & Jeremy Gorner, Blagojevich Re-Indicted, but Accusations the Same, CHI.
BREAKING NEWS CTR. (Feb. 4, 2010, 9:34 PM), http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/2010/02/
blagojevich-re-indicted-on-corruption-charges.html.
90. Smith, supra note 4, at 73.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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calculated performance, one aimed directly at getting a six o’clock
93
sound bite.”
The defense team’s pretrial approach remained the same for the
remaining months before trial: the defendant went on a “coast-to94
coast publicity blitz” while his lawyers talked strategy to the press.
Two days before the trial began, Aaron Goldstein, another member
of the Blagojevich defense team, engaged in a TV-broadcast
95
roundtable discussion on WTTW’s Chicago Tonight. When asked
about the defense strategy, Goldstein responded that the team would
96
show that Blagojevich was an innocent man and a good governor.
“What you will see is that every allegation was an innocent thing that
happened. Not only was it innocent and not criminal, he did nothing
97
wrong. He provided good for the state,” he said. Then, when the
discussion moved to the content of the tapes, Goldstein delved
further into the team’s strategy: “They are introducing around 100
tapes, most of them heavily redacted. . . . It is us that have constantly
asked, ‘Play all the tapes, play all the tapes.’ The government is not
going to. . . . We want to put in tapes that directly show his
98
innocence.” Goldstein said, however, that he was barred from
99
discussing the details of the content of the missing tapes. Finally,
Goldstein said Blagojevich would “absolutely” testify so that he could
100
explain everything on the tapes and fill in any gaps.

93. Id.; see also id. (“[T]rue to form, [Adam’s] over-the-top appearances have been
eclipsed only by the bombast and unrestrained theatricality of Blagojevich himself. . . . Adam
strode into the bright lights and the bouquet of microphones, turning what in the hands of
another lawyer might have been a predictable bout of no-comment rope-a-dope into a
freewheeling 20 minutes of rhetorical haymakers that would have put starch in Don King’s
fright wig.”).
94. Coen & Secter, supra note 85. This was a part of what one journalist described as
Blagojevich’s “blather defense.” Smith, supra note 4, at 139. Adam Jr. thought that if the public
could see how Blagojevich spoke his mind, then the defense could argue that what he had said
on tape was “little more than his typical claptrap and attempts to impress people.” Id.
95. Chicago Tonight (WTTW television broadcast June 1, 2010), available at http://
chicagotonight.wttw.com/2010/06/01/news-analysis-blagojevich-trial (previewing the Blagojevich
defense with host and news analyst Elizabeth Brackett).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. Near the end of the discussion, the host noted that it was unusual for a defendant’s
attorney to be willing to talk to the media on the eve of trial. Id.
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2. Sound Bites During the Trial. Once the trial began, the
101
defense team often let Blagojevich or his wife, Patti, do the talking.
At two notable points during the trial, however, the lawyers returned
to the cameras. The first appearance came after the completion of
prosecution witness and Blagojevich’s former chief of staff Alonzo
102
Monk’s testimony against the former governor. Following the final
day of Monk’s cross-examination, Adam Jr. stepped in front of the
103
cameras to address the media. Adam Jr. accused Monk of lying on
104
the stand in an attempt to get a deal from the government.
In my opinion, . . . it came out and anybody who was sitting in the
courtroom was able to see that this was . . . a man that was saying
what he needed to say to get a deal. . . . [H]e would tell a story and
then change that story, and then after he told the second story
change it back to another one. . . .
[At the e]nd of the day, when it comes to it, he couldn’t tell you one
105
deal that they had done that was illegal . . . .

These statements, along with Blagojevich’s own comments to the
press that same day, were widely broadcast and published in the
106
Chicago area. In response to Adam Jr.’s comments to the media,
the prosecution filed a motion the next day, requesting the court to
issue a gag order to limit the extrajudicial statements of the parties
107
and attorneys in the case. In its motion, the government referenced
the statements both Blagojevich and his attorneys had made before
108
the trial began, as well as those that were made during the trial. The

101. The Model Rule addressing trial publicity restricts only the speech of attorneys.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2010). The rule does not restrict the speech of the
defendant or his wife. Id.
102. Government’s Motion To Limit Extrajudicial Comments at 10–11, United States v.
Blagojevich, 743 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (No. 08 CR 888).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 10; Blagojevich Attorney: Monk “Couldn’t Name One Deal . . . Nothing!,” NBC
CHI. WARD ROOM (June 16, 2010), http://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/ward-room/Blagojevich_
Attorney__Monk__Couldn_t_Name_One_Deal___Nothing___Chicago.html.
106. See Government’s Motion To Limit Extrajudicial Comments, supra note 102, at 11
(“The above statements, opinions, and viewpoints regarding Lon Monk’s testimony, credibility,
and family members, as well as the day’s courtroom proceedings, were widely broadcast by the
media in the Chicago area. Television channels 2 and 9 aired the statements of both Rod
Blagojevich and his counsel; channel 5 currently has videos of both statements on its website.”).
107. Id. at 1.
108. Id. at 6–11.

KRAHENBUHL IN FINAL

184

10/6/2011 6:50:46 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:167

government argued that “[t]he defense’s constant media barrage has
reached the point where it poses a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing the trial in this case. . . . [T]he more intense the media
attention becomes, the greater the likelihood that a juror will
109
inadvertently be exposed to prejudicial external influences.” Judge
James Zagel denied the prosecution’s request to put an end to the
extrajudicial statements, calling the issuance of a gag order a last
resort, but he warned that everyone should use discretion when
110
making comments to the media.
Another significant interaction between Blagojevich’s counsel
and the media came just before the end of the trial. From the start,
the defense had said that Blagojevich would take the stand to explain
111
the gaps in the government’s tapes. But as the end of trial neared,
Adam Jr. and his father and fellow member of the defense team, Sam
Adam Sr., made it clear to the press that they were at odds about
112
whether to follow through with that promise. Adam Jr. wanted
113
Following the
Blagojevich to testify, and Adam Sr. did not.
announcement of the defense’s decision to rest its case without calling
a single witness, the father and son duo justified their position in time
for the evening news. Adam Jr. went first: “We think by putting him
up there to answer anything makes it seem as if the government was
114
right . . . .” His father followed those same sentiments. “The law is
clear. The burden of proof is on the government. They did not meet
115
their burden of proof and I think the jury will say that.” But after
the debrief on the decision, Adam Jr. felt as though he still had some

109. Id. at 13–14.
110. Paul Meincke, Blago Judge: Gag Order Is Last Resort, ABC 7 NEWS (June 17, 2010),
http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=7501331.
Following
Blagojevich’s
second trial, the Chicago Tribune reported, citing a “source familiar with the decision,” that
Judge Zagel “barred Blagojevich’s legal team from speaking to the news media during jury
deliberations.” Blagojevich Team Under Gag Order, Source Says, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 2011, § 1,
at 11. The following day, however, the newspaper reported that the court had sealed the
documents gagging the attorneys, and thus, “[i]t was unclear why [the judge] issued the order.”
Tribune Challenges Sealing of Documents in Blagojevich Retrial, CHI. TRIB. (June 24, 2011,
7:17 PM CDT), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-tribune-challengesdocuments-in-blagojevich-retrial-20110624,0,6097347.story.
111. See supra text accompanying note 100.
112. Ex-Gov. Blagojevich: ‘I Talk Too Much,’ ABC 7 NEWS (July 21, 2010), http://abclocal.
go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=7566578.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. ABC 7 News (WLS-TV television broadcast July 21, 2010), available at http://abclocal.
go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=7566578.
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explaining to do. Surrounded by a swarm of media, he made the
following statement:
Is there a harm when I go back and look at them on Monday and
say, “Look, I promised you; he wasn’t there”? Certainly! We’re
adults. We know it. But is that harm greater than . . . putting him on
the stand and saying . . . “We think they proved you guilty here; you
need to answer”? And right now, my father has said, and the
116
governor has said, we don’t need to answer that.

When asked by a reporter what he would say to the jury, Adam Jr.
responded with a laugh and said, “I pretty much just gave you part of
117
my closing.”
3. Post-Trial Statements. Blagojevich’s first trial ended with a
single conviction on one count of lying to federal agents; the jury
118
could not reach a consensus on the twenty-three remaining counts.
After the prosecution announced it would retry the case, the defense
attorneys slammed the government’s decision in the media, leading to
the defense’s most questionable extrajudicial statement regarding the
119
trial. When speaking to the press after the announcement, Adam Jr.
posed a question: “Why are we spending $20 million to $30 million on
120
a retrial when you couldn’t prove it the first time?” Referencing his
post-trial statements, Adam Jr. made it clear that he was “talking to
121
the next jury.” In its response to Blagojevich’s motion of acquittal,
the government noted that the defense had simply made up the cost
of a retrial and that they had clearly been making those and other

116. Chicago Tonight (WTTW television broadcast July 21, 2010), available at http://www.
wttw.com/main.taf?p=42,8,80,32,1&rel=4AKkZa1helDCwaN69MR_hbjRpXr1smDq.
117. Id.
118. Bob Secter, Jeff Coen & John Chase, Guilty on 1 Count, and Retrial Looms, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 18, 2010, § 1, at 1.
119. See Stacy St. Clair & David Heinzmann, 2 Sides Look Ahead to Blagojevich Retrial,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 18, 2010, § 1, at 3 (“Sam Adam and his son Sam Adam Jr. launched into a
diatribe against the city’s longest-serving U.S. attorney after hearing the jury’s verdict, calling
him ‘nuts’ and accusing him of running a ‘banana republic.’”). On retrial, a federal jury
convicted Blagojevich of seventeen counts, including eleven counts related to the Senate seat.
Bob Secter & Jeff Coen, Feds Vindicated as Jury Returns 17 Convictions, CHI. TRIB., June 28,
2011, § 1, at 1. At the time of publication, the former governor was awaiting sentencing.
120. St. Clair & Heinzmann, supra note 119.
121. Selecting Second Blago Jury Offers Challenge, ABC 7 NEWS (Aug. 20, 2010), http://abc
local.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=7618335.
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statements “to improperly influence the jury that will hear this case
122
on retrial.”
*

*

*

The manner in which Blagojevich’s defense team interacted with
123
the media before and during the trial may have been risky, but it is
less evident that any of the lawyers’ comments violated the current
124
version of Rule 3.6. Some of the lawyers’ statements were made
directly in response to the accusations Fitzgerald had made during his
initial press conference, and although one could argue that some of
the later statements would also qualify as a response under Rule
3.6(c), it is not clear from the rule or the commentary what is
sufficient to constitute “recent adverse publicity,” or what type of a
125
response would be considered “necessary.” This type of confusion
highlights the need for a revised rule that provides more guidance to
lawyers.
B. Explanations for Lawyers’ Interactions with the Media
Because defense lawyers and prosecutors have different roles in
126
the justice system, they also have different reasons for talking to the
media. Lawyers, in speaking to reporters, are generally concerned
about both providing the public with important information and
127
advancing the interests of their clients. When Fitzgerald spoke to
the press on the day of Blagojevich’s indictment, his intentions were

122. Government’s Response in Opposition to Defendant Rod Blagojevich’s Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal, Arrest of Judgment or New Trial at 28–29, United States v. Blagojevich,
743 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (No. 08 CR 888).
123. See supra text accompanying note 100.
124. If the lawyers involved in the case were actually to face disciplinary charges, those
would be brought based on a violation of the Illinois Rules, which contain a different standard
than Model Rule 3.6. Instead of assessing whether the lawyer knew or should have known that
his statements were “substantially likely to materially prejudice” a jury, Illinois applies a
“serious and imminent threat” standard. Selesnick, supra note 83, at 832–33. Because of this
difference, a lawyer would be more likely to violate Rule 3.6 than its Illinois counterpart. Id. at
842.
125. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(c) & cmt. 7 (2010); see also infra Part
II.C.1.
126. See infra Part III.B.
127. See Chemerinsky, supra note 70, at 871 (“The point is that attorney speech often serves
to advance the interests of the client and the interests of society. The former explains why
attorney speech, at times, is part of the duty of zealous representation. The latter helps to
explain why attorney speech is protected by the First Amendment.”).
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likely much different from those of the defense team when they
participated in later press conferences. Fitzgerald was acting in his
128
capacity as an officer of the court, and the defense attorneys were
attempting to further their client’s interests, both in terms of the
129
upcoming trial and in terms of protecting his public reputation.
One important reason prosecutors talk to reporters is to provide
130
the public with information. In talking to the media, a prosecutor
can inform the community about how public resources are being
131
utilized to serve law-enforcement goals. A prosecutor’s comments
132
can also serve as a warning about any ongoing dangers. In addition
to informing the public, a prosecutor’s statements might also
encourage witnesses or other victims to come forward with assistance
133
or might serve to deter other would-be criminals.
After an indictment, “the scales of justice in the eyes of the
134
public are weighed extraordinarily heavy against [the] accused.”
Because of this effect, the defense counsel’s motives for talking to the
media are different from the prosecutor’s. When Fitzgerald
announced on national television that tape recordings would show
135
that Blagojevich had attempted to sell Illinois’s vacant Senate seat,
the defense took an immediate hit. It would have been difficult for
the Blagojevich attorneys to sit back and watch the public turn
against their client with no response. In fact, a criminal defendant
would likely find it difficult to believe that his lawyer is fully
committed to his representation if the attorney simply allowed the
136
prosecutor to spin the media entirely in one direction. Thus,
immediately after an indictment, a defense lawyer often speaks out to
the media to restore the presumption of innocence and to level the
137
playing field before a trial. Aside from defense lawyers’ role as
zealous representatives of their clients, they also have an interest in

128. See infra notes 199–206 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 203–207 and accompanying text.
130. See Cassidy, supra note 83, at 73 (defining the public interests served by prosecutors’
extrajudicial statements).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 250 (7th Cir. 1975).
135. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
136. Kevin Cole & Fred C. Zacharias, The Agony of Victory and the Ethics of Lawyer
Speech, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1627, 1651 (1996).
137. Id. at 1647–49.
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exposing corruption among the police, prosecution, and the
138
judiciary, and in increasing the public’s understanding of flaws in
139
the trial process. These public functions justify the constitutional
140
protection of their extrajudicial speech.
Although these rationales explain some of the statements the
Blagojevich defense team made to the media, particularly those that
came prior to the start of the trial, the lawyers in that case continued
to talk to the press during the trial and after the verdict. Similarly,
even though Fitzgerald made fewer media appearances, he still
included extra information in his initial press conference that did not
141
seem to further any of these objectives. Thus, it is clear that there
must be another reason lawyers are motivated to talk to the press in
the course of ongoing litigation, one that applies to both sides: they
142
want to win their cases. Before representing O.J. Simpson, defense
attorney Robert Shapiro spoke to the importance of using the media
to one’s advantage in a high-profile case, explaining, “There is no
question that media coverage can and does affect the ultimate
outcome of widely publicized cases. Just as it is important to cultivate
relationships with judges and prosecutors, it is equally important to
143
establish and maintain such relationships with the press.”
When used in this way, lawyers’ statements are not directed
generally at the public. Instead, lawyers are talking to potential
144
jurors, actual jurors, or even the other side in the case. Sam Adam
Jr. made this point clear in his post-trial statements to the press:

138. See Bauer, 522 F.2d at 250 (“We can note that lawyers involved in investigations or
trials often are in a position to act as a check on government by exposing abuses or urging
action.”); Cole & Zacharias, supra note 136, at 1663 (“Sometimes, lawyers’ public statements
are justifiable as furthering society’s ‘right to know.’”).
139. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1070 (1991) (majority opinion of
Rehnquist, C.J.) (“[T]he criminal justice system exists in a larger context of a government
ultimately of the people, who wish to be informed about happenings in the criminal justice
system, and, if sufficiently informed about those happenings, might wish to make changes in the
system. The way most of them acquire information is from the media.”).
140. See Chemerinsky, supra note 70, at 871 (arguing for broader protection of defense
lawyers’ extrajudicial speech).
141. See supra text accompanying note 82.
142. See Stephen N. Zack, Foreword to ROGER J. DODD & CLAUDIA N. OLTEAN, MEDIA
SKILLS: THE LAWYER AS SPOKESPERSON, at v (2009) (“Lawyers who ignore the media . . . . risk
ceding the court of public opinion to their opponents.”).
143. Robert L. Shapiro, Using the Media to Your Advantage, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 1993, at
7, 11–12.
144. See Chemerinsky, supra note 70, at 870 (noting that in civil cases lawyers may be
speaking to the media as part of a strategy to encourage a settlement). Although this rationale
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I said from the very beginning that this government could not prove
Rod Blagojevich guilty of a single offense when it comes to any kind
of corruption or anything like that, and we were right. . . . I’m
looking at every single camera. I’m talking to the people of Illinois;
I’m talking and they are going to say I am talking to the next jury.
Yes, I’m talking to the next jury! . . . And when it comes to the next
time, I guarantee you, we’ll do everything we can like we did this
145
time to make sure.

If Adam Jr. was willing to admit to the public that his intention was to
reach the new jury in the case, many of his previous statements may
very well have been made with the same intention. It is unlikely that
Adam Jr.’s strategy is unique among lawyers who discuss their cases
in the media. Lawyers use the media as a forum for advancing their
cases, knowing, and perhaps hoping, that potential jurors are
146
listening.
Despite the likelihood that advocacy is one of the primary
motivations behind extrajudicial speech, the drafters made no
mention of such a purpose in any of the commentary surrounding the
147
development of the trial-publicity rules prior to 1994. Even if this
omission could be construed as a sign of the drafters’ initial
disapproval of lawyers’ advocacy in the media, the 1994 amendments
to the rule suggest a possible evolution in the drafters’ understanding
148
of the role of extrajudicial speech. In Gentile, Justice Kennedy
addressed a defense lawyer’s role in the court of public opinion,
arguing that “[a]n attorney’s duties do not begin inside the courtroom

only applies to the civil context, the same concept may extend to plea negotiations in criminal
cases.
145. Blago Attorney: Blame Me for One Guilty Count, WARD ROOM (Aug. 17, 2010),
http://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/ward-room/Blago_Attorney___Blame_Me_for_One_Guilty_
Count_Chicago.html. Although post-trial statements would generally have much less of a
potential to affect the outcome of a case, Adam Jr. knew of the government’s intention to retry
the case at the time he made the statements.
146. See DODD & OLTEAN, supra note 142, § 1.4, at 8 (“Media exposure, whether
promulgated through TV or radio stations, newspapers, or the web, affect[s] how opposing
counsel, prosecutors and juries view a . . . client’s . . . guilt/innocence.” (emphasis added)).
147. See Brown, supra note 19, at 103 (“[O]ne might reasonably surmise that the drafters
were principally concerned about the public educative function and not the adversarial benefit
that extrajudicial speech could generate for a client.”); Jonathan M. Moses, Note, Legal Spin
Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1811, 1825
(1995) (“[Rule 3.6] discount[s] the importance of advocacy in the court of public opinion for a
client.”).
148. See Brown, supra note 19, at 103 (“Rule 3.6 represented a ‘warming-up’ to the concept
of lawyer commentary in the media.”).
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door.” Kennedy noted that lawyers “may take reasonable steps to
defend a client’s reputation and reduce the adverse consequences of
indictment, especially in the face of a prosecution deemed unjust or
150
commenced with improper motives.” Kennedy also suggested that
defense attorneys might attempt to secure a dismissal of a client’s case
151
through persuasion in the court of public opinion. In response to
the Court’s Gentile opinion, the ABA altered Rule 3.6 to incorporate
152
a right-of-reply provision.
Although this reply provision only
permits lawyers to respond to recent adverse publicity and does not
allow lawyers to advocate for their clients in the court of public
opinion if it is likely to lead to material prejudice, it is nevertheless a
sign that the rule writers are now willing to acknowledge a lawyer’s
role as an advocate outside the courtroom.
C. The Misleading Structure of Rule 3.6
Despite the addition of the right-of-reply provision, Rule 3.6 is
still framed primarily in terms of protecting the right to a fair trial and
153
preventing prejudice, acknowledging the need for advocacy only in
154
response to adverse publicity. There are two main weaknesses in
the rule that should be addressed. First, the limits on the response
provision in subsection (c) are unclear and lead to confusion about
exactly how much extrajudicial advocacy is allowed. This lack of
clarity in the rule’s limitations forces lawyers to guess how their
155
conduct will be viewed and leaves disciplinary authorities unable to
156
enforce the rule in a principled way. Second, the state’s interest in
restricting lawyer speech is misguided as it applies to defense lawyers.
Prosecutors and defense attorneys must look to the same rule to try
to decipher how their unique interests should be properly balanced.

149. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1043 (1991) (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 65–66.
153. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 1 (2010) (“Preserving the right to
a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated
about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved.”).
154. Id. R. 3.6(c).
155. Chemerinsky, supra note 70, at 884–85.
156. See Brown, supra note 19, at 137 (“[G]iven the lack of meaningful ethical or procedural
oversight or constraints with regard to the limits of such conduct, there is legitimate concern
that extrajudicial advocacy is being, and will continue to be, utilized in an increasingly
unprofessional and deleterious fashion.”).
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1. Lack of Clarity on the Right of Reply. Rule 3.6(c) allows
lawyers to make extrajudicial statements in response to recent
157
adverse publicity about their clients. The commentary to the rule
provides that “responsive statements should be limited to contain
only such information as is necessary to mitigate undue prejudice
158
created by the statements made by others.” Considering the more
general limitation on lawyers’ extrajudicial speech in subsection (a), it
is difficult for lawyers to determine when statements to the media are
159
necessary and when they might exceed the rule’s limitations.
Although Rule 3.6(c) seemingly applies without distinction to both
prosecutors and defense attorneys, the standard for when responsive
160
statements are warranted is likely to vary for each side. The rule’s
language suggests only that some sort of attack is necessary before
lawyers can respond with public comment, but neither the rule nor
the comments provide any guidance about exactly what is enough to
161
constitute an attack. Thus, a defense lawyer might argue that an
indictment always qualifies as an attack on a defendant’s character,
and that because of that, any filing of criminal charges triggers a
162
defense lawyer’s right of reply under Rule 3.6(c). It is also possible,
however, that the rule writers expected that some sort of public
statement attacking one side or the other, like an initial press
conference announcing an indictment, would be required before an
attorney could respond. Under either evaluation, the defense would
be much more likely than the prosecution to face an attack allowing
extrajudicial comments under Rule 3.6(c).
If the committee indeed intended to allow defense attorneys
more of an opportunity to speak out in the media, knowing that an
157. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(c).
158. Id. R. 3.6 cmt. 7.
159. See Devine, supra note 74, at 210 (observing that the Rule 3.6(c) commentary provides
lawyers with only a partial standard for determining what type of response is appropriate); see
also Brown, supra note 19, at 110–11 (“Given the widespread media coverage of high-profile
cases, ranging from general news reports to in-depth television talk shows to the unbridled
commentary now provided via the Internet, one might reasonably question whether, as a result
of the right of reply exception, the door for responsive extrajudicial statements is ever truly
closed in such cases.” (footnotes omitted)).
160. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 5 (“Nothing in this Comment is
intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with Rule 3.6(b)
or 3.6(c).”).
161. See id. R. 3.6(c) & cmt. 7 (“[R]esponsive statements should be limited to contain only
such information as is necessary to mitigate undue prejudice created by the statements made by
others.”).
162. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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indictment would automatically constitute an attack allowing a
response, the prosecution, while ostensibly retaining a right of reply,
would have fewer opportunities to take advantage of the provision.
This discrepancy would have the effect of expanding defense lawyers’
right to speak while essentially maintaining the rule as it applies to
prosecutors. This interpretation could have been a step in the right
direction toward an appropriate division in the rule, reflecting
163
lawyers’ individual roles and responsibilities. Such an intention,
however, was not clear from the committee’s notes, and it is certainly
not clear in the text of the rule.
Without meaningful guidance or enforceability, Rule 3.6 allows
“hyper-zealous” lawyers to “press[] the boundaries of proper
164
extrajudicial comment.” Defense lawyers with more resources are
able to spend more time discovering the rule’s weaknesses and
loopholes, and therefore, they are unlikely to fear the repercussions
165
of defending their clients in the media. Although there is nothing
inherently wrong with this type of advocacy, lawyers who feel
comfortable pushing the limits may go too far, risking damage to their
166
clients’ cases or to the legal profession as a whole. Conversely, there
is likely an inequitable chilling effect for those lawyers who will not
go nearly as far without some sense of comfort that their comments
167
are within the bounds of the rule. If lawyers do not have the funds
to develop a media strategy, it is unlikely that they will find ways to
168
manipulate the rules to favor their clients. These lawyers with fewer
resources are more likely to provide a default “no comment”
response to media inquiries for fear that they will unintentionally
163. See infra Part III.B.
164. Brown, supra note 19, at 111–12.
165. See Gregg, supra note 18, at 1362 & n.161 (explaining that “sophisticated lawyers” are
the ones who are “most capable of evading the constraints of these Rules”).
166. See Brown, supra note 19, at 137 (“[T]here is legitimate concern that extrajudicial
advocacy is being, and will continue to be, utilized in an increasingly unprofessional and
deleterious fashion.”).
167. See Gregg, supra note 18, at 1361–62 (“This creates a genuine risk that overly cautious
lawyers in lower profile trials will unnecessarily limit or forego contact with the media for fear
of discipline.”). The authors of a book guiding lawyers on their interactions with the media
suggest that “[t]oo often, lawyers read Rule 3.6, in its variations, as being restrictive of what a
lawyer may say when, in fact, it is informative in saying that a lawyer may make many
statements . . . .” DODD & OLTEAN, supra note 142, § 3.8, at 52. This highlights one of the
primary concerns about the rule—even though the authors claim that the rule is “informative”
in its language allowing lawyer speech, if lawyers are unable to discern that from the text, they
will remain silent.
168. Gregg, supra note 18, at 1362.
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169

violate Rule 3.6. This inequity is troubling because it means publicinterest lawyers and lawyers representing indigent criminal
defendants often will be unwilling to talk to the media, even though
their clients may need that form of advocacy more than a defendant
170
like Blagojevich. The development of a rule that provides clearer
guidelines for defense lawyers’ ability to speak to the media could
allow these lawyers to feel more comfortable advocating for their
171
clients outside of the courtroom.
2. Misguided Purpose. Past committee reports justify restricting
extrajudicial lawyer speech by suggesting that the state’s interest is in
protecting an overall concept of fairness in adjudicative
172
proceedings. In the comments to the current rule, however, the rule
writers noted only the state’s interest in “protecting the right to a fair
173
trial.” Although it is possible that certain statements by a defense
lawyer could prejudice the prosecution’s case, it is the defendant, and

169. Id. For example, in Gentile, the lawyer did not intentionally push the limits of the rule;
he decided to make the statements only after studying the language of the Nevada rule. Gentile
v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1044 (1991) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); see also Chemerinsky,
supra note 70, at 884–85 (warning that “lawyers must speculate as to how, after the fact, their
speech will be assessed” and that “[t]he inherent vagueness and uncertainty is virtually certain
to chill speech”).
170. Gregg, supra note 18, at 1362.
171. One might argue that a rule allowing more expansive public comment from defense
lawyers could actually have the effect of furthering the inequity because some lawyers would
still feel uncomfortable handling the publicity side of their clients’ cases. Although a rule that
clearly allows defense lawyers to advocate for their clients outside of the courtroom could
expand defense lawyers’ overall interactions with the media, lawyers representing defendants
with fewer resources may still be unable to spend time developing a media strategy. The rule
already has this general effect, and it is important to at least afford all lawyers the opportunity
to speak on behalf of their clients in the media without the fear of violating an ethical rule.
172. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. “When a state regulation implicates First
Amendment rights, the Court must balance those interests against the State’s legitimate interest
in regulating the activity in question.” Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075 (majority opinion of Rehnquist,
C.J.).
173. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 1 (2010) (emphasis added). Even if
the rule writers intended this statement to refer to the more generalized protection they
referenced in their draft, such a concern explains only why the rule applies to both prosecutors
and defense lawyers, and not why the “Rule draws no distinction between [the two].” MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 notes at 148 (Proposed Final Draft 1981). The commentary
to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 8-1.1, which focuses on attorneys’ extrajudicial
statements and parallels an earlier version of the Model Rule, suggests that one reason for a
lack of any distinction in the trial-publicity rules is that there “is a general presumption in the
adversarial system of rules applying equally to both sides.” ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS standard 8-1.1 cmt. at 7 (1992).
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not the state, who is guaranteed Sixth Amendment protection.
Therefore, the current rule, focused on protecting the right to a fair
trial and limiting the potential for prejudice, is more appropriately
directed toward prosecutors.
In the concurring portion of his opinion in Gentile, Justice
Kennedy argued that “[t]he various bar association and advisory
commission reports which resulted in promulgation of ABA Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 (1981), and other regulations of
attorney speech, and sources they cite, present no convincing case for
175
restrictions upon the speech of defense attorneys.” Perhaps the lack
of any satisfying explanation about the state’s interest in restricting
defense attorneys’ speech is the result of the rule writers’ attempt to
produce one rule which applies equally to defense lawyers and
prosecutors. Such a rule, however, will result in confusion unless the
same interests are at stake.
Cases involving challenges to extrajudicial statements made by
defense attorneys seem to discuss restrictions on defense lawyers’
speech as a means of protecting the overall integrity of the judicial
system. For example, in Sheppard, the Supreme Court expressed a
concern about the “orderly administration of justice” and the lack of
176
“protective procedures” in the media. Justice Clark argued that
freedom of discussion “must not be allowed to divert the trial from
the ‘very purpose of a court system . . . to adjudicate controversies,
both criminal and civil, in the calmness and solemnity of the
177
courtroom according to legal procedures.’” Similarly, in Gentile,
Justice Kennedy argued that “[a] profession which takes just pride in
the[] traditions [of the judicial system] may consider them disserved if
lawyers use their skills and insight to make untested allegations in the
178
press instead of in the courtroom.” In his portion of the Gentile
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist focused more on the “threat to the
fairness of a pending proceeding” that lawyers’ extrajudicial
statements may pose, but he still noted that the rule is designed to

174. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”).
175. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1055 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
176. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350–51 (1966) (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331, 347 (1946); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 313 (1959)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
177. Id. (omission in original) (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 583 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
178. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1058 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
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protect both the fairness and the integrity of the judicial system.
Although protecting the fairness of a trial is certainly a concern that
justifies restricting prosecutors’ speech, protecting the dignity and
legitimacy of the adjudicative process provides a much better
180
argument for restricting defense lawyers’ extrajudicial statements.
Therefore, restrictions on prosecutors’ extrajudicial speech are
justified by the current rationale underlying Rule 3.6, but any
restrictions on defense lawyers’ extrajudicial speech must be justified
by concerns about the legitimacy of the adjudicative process.
III. REWORKING THE GUIDELINES FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL
ADVOCACY
A. Importance of a Workable Rule
The effect of lawyers’ extrajudicial statements on the outcome of
181
a criminal jury trial “is, at best, inconclusive.” But even if there is no
clear link between lawyers’ statements to the media and the outcome
of a trial, that does not mean that there is no reason for concern
about lawyers’ extrajudicial speech. By definition, high-profile trials
182
command substantial media coverage. To the extent that the media
183
is involved, there is likely to be an influence on public opinion, and
defense lawyers will be concerned about the way their clients are
184
perceived by the public and, ultimately, the jury. Defense lawyers’

179. Id. at 1074–75 (majority opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
180. This is not to say that the state interest in protecting the integrity of the judicial system
does not apply to prosecutor speech. Instead, the argument is that the most reasonable
explanation for restricting defense lawyers is to protect the integrity of the system. Restrictions
on prosecutorial speech may be founded in both the concern about protecting the defendant’s
right to a fair trial and protecting the overall legitimacy of the process.
181. Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, Silence Is Golden: The New Illinois Rules on Attorney
Extrajudicial Speech, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 323, 360 (2002); see also Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1054–55
(opinion of Kennedy, J.) (“Empirical research suggests that in the few instances when jurors
have been exposed to extensive and prejudicial publicity, they are able to disregard it and base
their verdict upon the evidence presented in court.”); Gregg, supra note 18, at 1366 (“[D]espite
careful and thorough tests, there is no hard evidence that statements ever do prejudice juries.”).
182. Beth A. Wilkinson & Steven H. Schulman, Essay, When Talk Is Not Cheap:
Communications with the Media, the Government and Other Parties in High Profile White Collar
Criminal Cases, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 203, 203–05 (2002).
183. See Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How
Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 404 (2006)
(“[W]orrisome evidence suggests that [the news media] is playing a significant role in shaping—
or distorting—public opinion.”).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 144–146.
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interactions with the media throughout the litigation process can be
seen as attempts to mitigate baseline prejudice against their clients.
An indictment, together with extensive media coverage based on
information from the police and prosecution, will place a defendant at
185
a disadvantage from the start. Although a defense lawyer may not
be responding to specific instances of adverse publicity during the
course of ongoing litigation, the lawyer may be concerned about the
general unevenness of the playing field. Often a lawyer advocates for
a client in the media not simply to ensure a favorable jury verdict, but
186
also to protect the defendant’s public reputation from undue harm.
Some scholars go as far as to say that speaking to the press on behalf
187
of a client is an essential element of zealous representation.
In addition to the need for a rule to allow for effective
representation in the media, additional guidance is necessary to
protect the dignity of the legal profession. Press coverage of a trial
inevitably leads the public to adopt certain perceptions about the
188
parties and the lawyers involved in the trial. This media coverage
can cause lawyers to act differently than they otherwise would. For
example, one of the main concerns after the televised O.J. Simpson
trial was that television cameras had caused trial participants to act

185. See Matheson, supra note 47, at 890 n.143 (“It is well-established that reporters get
most of their crime news from law enforcement sources.”); Judith L. Maute, “In Pursuit of
Justice” in High Profile Criminal Matters, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1745, 1751 (2002) (“Our
adversarial system of justice is theoretically weighted against the prosecution, in favor of
protecting the innocent. Wide disparities in available resources for the opposing sides practically
tip the scales the other way.”); see also David A. Strauss, Why It’s Not Free Speech Versus Fair
Trial, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 109, 117–18 (“[I]t might be argued that out-of-court advocacy by a
defense lawyer is valuable even if—indeed just because—it is directed to potential jurors. The
value is not that it contributes to society or democratic government generally, but precisely that
it enhances the chances that the trial will be fair.”).
186. See Gregg, supra note 18, at 1327 (“Evidence shows that the preponderance of trial
publicity is negative to criminal defendants.”).
187. See Chemerinsky, supra note 70, at 861 (“[A] lawyer’s duty to zealously represent a
client often is best served by the attorney speaking to the press. Indeed, what generally has been
overlooked is how attorney speech about pending cases can advance the interests of the client
and the justice system.”). But see Maute, supra note 185, at 1756 (“Criminal cases should be
tried in court, not in the media. Period.”); Hal Haddon, Representing a Celebrity Criminal
Defendant, GPSOLO, Mar. 2008, at 26, 26 (“However flattering requests for interviews may be, it
is almost always a mistake for a criminal defense lawyer to grant one while the case is pending,
especially on the front end of a case before the facts are fully known.”).
188. See DODD & OLTEAN, supra note 142, § 2.7.2.3, at 36 (“The image you project directly
impacts how you are perceived—as a lawyer and potential media spokesperson. Image is a
measure of your professionalism and credibility, even your character.”).
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differently than they would have without the media’s presence.
Though this concern was in reference to having media inside, rather
than outside, of the courtroom, the concerns still apply here. When a
lawyer makes statements to the media about ongoing litigation, the
presence of a camera will likely influence what the lawyer says and
190
how he says it. The worry is that lawyers’ statements could lead the
public to develop a negative impression of the judicial system and
191
thus lower public opinion of and trust in lawyers. To prevent this
result, “trial publicity rules can act as a shield against an undignified
192
public spectacle.” But to serve as a shield, the rules must be clear
about the extent to which advocacy is allowed.
Despite its desirability, a “complete separation of a court of law
from the court of public opinion is unattainable, and we should
193
readily admit that it cannot be achieved.” Media coverage of a case
will have an effect on the public, and therefore, many defense lawyers
will feel a need to advocate for their clients beyond the courtroom
doors. Although many view this advocacy as an important element of
194
representation, it is not clear that it is allowed under the current
Rule 3.6, and even if it is, lawyers are left in the dark about its
195
appropriate boundaries. What is important is that we give lawyers
189. See Diane Furno-Lamude, The Media Spectacle and the O.J. Simpson Case, in THE O.J.
SIMPSON TRIALS: RHETORIC, MEDIA, AND THE LAW 19, 34 (Janice Schuetz & Lin S. Lilley eds.,
1999) (explaining that Judge Hiroshi Fujisaki’s decision to ban television cameras from entering
the courtroom during O.J. Simpson’s civil trial was in part because the “electronic coverage of
the [criminal] trial significantly diverted and distracted the participants therein[ and] it
appear[ed] that the conduct of witnesses and counsel were unduly influenced by the presence of
the electronic media” (quoting Rufo v. Simpson, 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2213, 2215 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1996))).
190. In responding to a survey about the effect the media has on court participants, Judge
Nauman Scott of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana explained what
he sees as the “inevitable” effect of media presence: “One has only to see a televised football
game. All the fans come to see the game but the game is forgotten immediately and their
attention is captured by the camera, as soon as they find that they are on television.” Laralyn M.
Sasaki, Electronic Media Access to Federal Courtrooms: A Judicial Response, 23 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 769, 788–89 (1990).
191. See Cole & Zacharias, supra note 136, at 1667 (arguing that the more lawyers engage
with the media, the less clients and the public will trust them and view them in a professional
light); see also Gregg, supra note 18, at 1330 (explaining that one interest furthered by the trialpublicity rules is the restraint of “flamboyant, media-savvy lawyers who regularly appear in the
media”).
192. Gregg, supra note 18, at 1330.
193. Gerald F. Uelmen, Leaks, Gags and Shields: Taking Responsibility, 37 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 943, 946 (1997).
194. See infra notes 247–251 and accompanying text.
195. See supra Part II.C.1.
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an equal opportunity to speak and provide them with reasonable
limitations and guidelines to ensure that they are representing their
clients effectively.
B. Recognizing the Separate Roles of Prosecutors and Defense
Attorneys
To provide clearer guidance, separate trial-publicity rules for
prosecution and defense lawyers must be created that account for
both the different purposes of each side’s extrajudicial speech and the
197
distinct values that such restrictions seek to protect. Because these
198
interests are different, separate rules are required to account for the
unique roles of lawyers on both sides and, ultimately, to provide
clearer and more practical regulations.
Patrick Fitzgerald and the defense lawyers likely had different
reasons for interacting with or choosing not to interact with the media
199
in the midst of the Blagojevich trial. These differences, in turn,
reflect their distinct roles in the trial and the greater functions of
prosecutors and defense attorneys in the adversarial system. Justice
200
Sutherland’s 1935 opinion in Berger v. United States stated what
201
commentators view as the true position of a prosecutor: “The
United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose . . . interest, therefore, in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
202
shall be done.” Although Berger was not a case about prosecutors’
ethical responsibilities, it properly construes a prosecutor’s position as
one much closer to that of a judicial officer than a client’s advocate.
In fact, a prosecutor is often described as having a dual role in the
203
criminal justice system. In addition to obtaining convictions of the

196. For a discussion of the inequities under the current rule, see supra notes 164–171 and
accompanying text.
197. There is also a need to provide lawyers involved in civil litigation with clear guidelines
on extrajudicial advocacy, but this Note addresses only the rule as it applies to prosecutors and
criminal-defense lawyers. See supra note 42.
198. See supra Part II.C.2.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 126–129.
200. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
201. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Are Prosecutorial Ethics Standards Different?, 68 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1453, 1454 (2000) (noting that Justice Sutherland’s opinion is frequently cited by those
discussing prosecutors’ ethical obligations).
202. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
203. See WOLFRAM, supra note 45, § 13.10.1, at 759 (describing the prosecutor’s dual role).
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guilty, a prosecutor must ensure that justice is done. Because of
these responsibilities, prosecutors are often seen as being much more
205
constrained as advocates than defense attorneys : “The prosecutor’s
required objective . . . is to secure the result, whether conviction or
acquittal, indicated by a good faith inspection of the facts and the
206
law.”
By contrast, a defense lawyer’s primary duty is to zealously
207
represent his client.
This function includes making strategic
208
decisions about the trial as well as “defend[ing] a client’s reputation
209
and reduc[ing] the adverse consequences of indictment.” Because
the limits on a defense lawyer’s zeal are unclear, these lawyers must
210
employ their best judgment and advocate in good faith. This duty
does not mean, however, that the defense lawyer’s sole responsibility
is to the client. Defense lawyers also have an obligation to the court
211
and to the opposing counsel.
Thus, whereas the prosecutor’s role can be seen as largely one of
212
cooperation, criminal defense attorneys have the responsibility to
competently represent their clients and zealously advocate for the
213
best possible results in their cases, providing much more of an
204. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648–49 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). This
opinion is also reflected elsewhere in the Model Rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2010) (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and
not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that
the defendant is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient
evidence, and that special precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of
innocent persons.”).
205. WOLFRAM, supra note 45, § 13.10.4, at 765.
206. Id.; see also Maute, supra note 185, at 1750 (“Prosecutors should be held to insure [sic]
that one of the basic tenets of the adversary system is satisfied at trial: protect the public interest
in fundamental fairness.”).
207. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 2 (2010); ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 4-1.2 cmt. at 122 (1993).
208. WOLFRAM, supra note 45, § 10.5.3, at 590. The defense attorney has quite a bit of
discretion in making decisions with regard to trial strategy. Id. For example, decisions about
which witnesses to call are generally left to the lawyer’s determination. Id.
209. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1043 (1991) (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
210. WOLFRAM, supra note 45, § 10.5.3, at 589.
211. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 4-1.2 cmt. at
122. The defense lawyer’s primary obligation to the court may still come back to the client. See
id. standard 4-1.2(b) (“The basic duty defense counsel owes to the administration of justice and
as an officer of the court is to serve as the accused’s counselor and advocate with courage and
devotion and to render effective, quality representation.”).
212. McMunigal, supra note 201, at 1462.
213. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION standard 4-1.2 cmt. at
122–23.
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214

adversarial function. On the spectrum between cooperative and
adversarial, defense attorneys and prosecutors generally drift in
215
opposite directions. Thus, although any rule must ensure that the
legitimacy of the adjudicative system is not compromised, the
provisions that apply to prosecutors must focus on protecting the
procedural safeguards of the system, whereas the provisions for
defense attorneys must allow successful advocacy.
C. A New Standard for Defense Attorneys
As noted in Part II.C.2, the current version of Rule 3.6 is focused
216
on protecting the fairness of a trial. This rule is a fitting standard for
prosecutors because the state’s interest in restricting prosecutors’
extrajudicial speech is appropriately aligned with the rule’s stated
217
As applied to defense attorneys, however, the state
purpose.
218
As a result, defense
interest justifying the rule is misguided.
attorneys are left with confusing guidelines and unclear limitations on
their advocacy in the media. To address this problem, this Note
suggests a new, separate standard to address defense attorneys’
extrajudicial advocacy.
Any rule limiting defense lawyers’ extrajudicial advocacy, like
any restriction on speech protected by the First Amendment, must be
219
no more extensive than necessary to fulfill the state’s interest. With
that in mind, rule writers should shift their focus for defense lawyers
from a rule aimed at protecting the overall fairness of a trial to
specific guidelines for proper extrajudicial advocacy that will ensure
220
the legitimacy of the judicial system. A rule structured in this way
will provide disciplinary authorities with guidelines for sanctioning
221
attorneys who go beyond the limits of extrajudicial advocacy and
will allow defense lawyers who otherwise do not have the resources to

214. Id.
215. See McMunigal, supra note 201, at 1462–63 (warning against an oversimplification of
the cooperative and adversarial functions but noting “that the proportions of the cooperative
and adversarial views that make up th[e] dual role are different for the criminal defense lawyer
than they are for the prosecutor”).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 172–174.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 172–174.
218. See supra text accompanying note 180.
219. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991) (majority opinion of Rehnquist,
C.J.).
220. See supra notes 176–180 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 164–166 and accompanying text.
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seek out the loopholes in the current rule to feel more comfortable
222
speaking on behalf of their clients in the court of public opinion.
In Gentile, Justice Kennedy noted that “[t]he vigorous advocacy
we demand of the legal profession is accepted because it takes place
223
under the neutral, dispassionate control of the judicial system.” It
seems to follow, therefore, that any limitation placed on a defense
lawyer’s advocacy outside of the courtroom should be no greater than
the limitations placed on such advocacy during trial. But rule writers
must also be realistic and must recognize that there are additional
values implicated by allowing lawyers to make statements outside of
224
A new rule should allow defense lawyers to
the courtroom.
225
advocate for their clients in the media at any time, but this new rule
should also prohibit any discussion of evidence unless the lawyer has
226
a good-faith belief that such evidence will be admitted at trial and
should require that lawyers have a good-faith belief that any
227
comments they make to the media are factually correct. These
limitations would be substantial enough to satisfy any concerns about
protecting the legitimacy of the system but would provide defense
lawyers with clear guidelines for extrajudicial advocacy.
In 1994, following the Court’s decision in Gentile, the ABA
revised Rule 3.6 in an attempt to address the Court’s concerns about
228
the trial-publicity rule’s vagueness. As a part of those revisions, the
committee moved to the comment section a provision that provided
that statements relating to “information that the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a

222. See supra notes 167–171 and accompanying text.
223. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1058 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 137–140.
225. This change would eliminate the confusion associated with the current right of reply in
Rule 3.6(c). See supra Part II.C.1.
226. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1047 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (“At trial, all material
information disseminated during petitioner’s press conference was admitted in evidence before
the jury, including information questioning the motives and credibility of supposed victims who
testified against [petitioners’ client] . . . .”); see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 360
(1966) (“The exclusion of [inadmissible] evidence in court is rendered meaningless when news
media make it available to the public.”).
227. See Chemerinsky, supra note 70, at 887 (“A better approach would be to limit lawyers
only from making statements about pending cases that they know to be false or that are made
with reckless disregard for the truth.”). Dean Chemerinsky applies the standard for criticism of
government officials in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) to the context of
lawyer speech, which in part required that “the regulating authority must prove the falsity of the
statements.” Chemerinsky, supra note 70, at 885–86.
228. See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text.
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trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of
prejudicing an impartial trial” are “more likely than not to have a
229
material prejudicial effect on a proceeding.” The committee made
this revision because it felt that, to avoid the vagueness problems
identified by the Court, the text of the rule should only include clear
230
standards. But the Gentile Court did not mention this portion of the
rule in its opinion. Instead, it was concerned more with the rule’s safeharbor provision, which previously had given lawyers the impression
231
that they could safely discuss the entirety of their client’s defense.
In fact, a rule that prohibits statements relating to evidence that
lawyers have a good-faith belief will not be admissible at trial seems
to provide a clearer standard than one that requires lawyers to
determine what may be considered prejudicial. Instead of
contributing to the vagueness of the rule, such a limitation would
provide a clear dividing line between proper and improper statements
to the press.
The portion of the rule that would require defense lawyers to
have a good-faith belief that the statements they make to the press
are factually correct also reflects the type of advocacy that is allowed
in court. Just as lawyers cannot knowingly offer false evidence or
perjured testimony at trial, they could not do so to the media under
232
this new rule. This rule encourages fair competition and prevents
lawyers from using improper tactics in zealously representing their
233
clients. Lawyers should not be allowed to use the media as a back

229. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 5 (2010). Although this provision is
different from the standard for defense lawyers suggested in this Note, it is still very similar in
terms of the type of statements it would disallow.
230. ABA STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY & ABA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 41, at 7.
231. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. It is also possible that the Court was
concerned about the confusion that could arise from a rule containing categorical prohibitions
on certain types of statements in addition to a safe-harbor provision. See Bernabe-Reifkohl,
supra note 181, at 368–70 (arguing that the ABA moved the provision containing a list of
statements more than likely to cause prejudice to a comment in Rule 3.6 because that provision
and the safe-harbor provision “could not stand together”).
232. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4.
233. See id. R. 3.4 cmt. 1 (“The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the
evidence in a case is to be marshalled competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition
in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of
evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the
like.”).
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door for making false statements that would otherwise be disallowed
234
in court.
Aside from the two suggested limitations, decisions about when
and how to talk to the media should be left to the discretion of the
defense attorneys. These decisions would be part of their trial
strategy, giving lawyers wide latitude in making decisions related to
235
Any challenge to decisions regarding
extrajudicial advocacy.
extrajudicial advocacy could be assessed in terms of the standard
236
articulated in Strickland v. Washington : “There are countless ways
to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best
criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the
237
Under the Strickland standard, there is a strong
same way.”
238
presumption that a lawyer’s decisions are sound trial strategy. In
making strategic decisions about how to interact with the media,
defense lawyers would have to think carefully about the best
approach for their particular clients.
Commentators disagree about what constitutes proper trial
239
strategy with regard to interactions with the media. Some believe
that it is not necessary for defense lawyers to speak to the media and
240
that it can, at times, be detrimental to a client’s case. For example,
241
defense attorney Hal Haddon has argued that even though it might
seem like a defense lawyer’s responsibility to respond when police or
prosecutors leak false or detrimental information to the media,
speaking out too soon can be dangerous because defense lawyers
often do not have the same command of the facts on the front end of
242
a case as the prosecution does. Haddon also believes that it is good
234. See Moses, supra note 147, at 1852 (“Lawyers should not use this free-style form of
advocacy to make unfounded allegations that they would not make in the courtroom for fear of
sanctions.”).
235. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s
performance must be highly deferential.”).
236. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
237. Id. at 689.
238. Id.
239. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
169, 182 (1997) (“[W]hen speaking to the press, lawyers are putting their own integrity on the
line; they need not say anything to the press to represent their clients effectively.”).
241. Haddon is a prominent defense attorney in Denver, Colorado, and has represented
such high-profile clients as John Ramsey and Kobe Bryant. This Defense Team Never Rests,
WASH. POST, July 27, 2003, at E3.
242. Harold A. Haddon, Remarks at the Duke University School of Law Conference on the
Court of Public Opinion (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/copo/defense.
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practice for defense lawyers to avoid making substantive statements
to the press when the facts of a case do not appear to be in favor of
243
their clients. His default strategy in both high- and low-profile cases
244
is to avoid making statements to the media. Other commentators
argue that lawyers simply are not experts in public relations, and
245
because of that, they should not play that role for their clients. They
point out that law schools teach trial advocacy and not advocacy in
246
the court of public opinion.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky
argues that “a lawyer who is zealously representing a client, at times,
247
should be making statements to the media.” Chemerinsky suggests
that it is unwise for defense lawyers to take the chance that adverse
248
publicity will not affect their clients’ cases. Instead, according to
Chemerinsky, lawyers should be prepared to counter any statements
249
made against their clients. Commentators on this side of the debate
note that defense lawyers may make statements to the media not
simply to further their clients’ interests at trial, but also to protect
250
their clients’ public reputations. In a book instructing lawyers on
media strategy, Stephen Zack, former ABA president, suggests that

243. Id. Haddon noted that it may be important to make a statement if the prosecutors have
a press conference or if police officers have been leaking information to the media.
But then shut up. And if you don’t have anything to say, because occasionally your
client may be more guilty than not, either say nothing or . . . say . . . ladies and
gentlemen, I’m really outraged at the leaks that the prosecutor and the police have
been putting out in this case. I think it’s highly inappropriate. I think it’s an insult to
the jury who is going to hear this case that these people think that they can try to
manipulate them through the media. I will have a lot to say when I get to court and
I’ll see you in court.
Id.
244. See id. (“[I]f I do [talk to the media], I do it in writing, because that can’t be
misunderstood.”). He added, “If you have to seize the wolf by the ears, do it with care.” Id.
245. Laurie L. Levenson, Remarks at the Duke University School of Law Conference on the
Court of Public Opinion (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/copo/defense
(relaying defense attorney Tom Mesereau’s views).
246. Id.
247. Chemerinsky, supra note 70, at 868.
248. Id.
249. See id. (“[An] attorney should always speak out and counter potentially harmful
publicity unless the harm is clearly trivial.”). Chemerinsky suggests that in addition to speaking
to the public and potential jurors, defense attorneys should at times “speak out to generate
media interest in their cases with the hope that the public scrutiny will cause judges to be more
careful and fair.” Id. at 871.
250. See Uelmen, supra note 193, at 951–52 (“A client who is never prosecuted, or who is
prosecuted and acquitted, may have been ill-served by a lawyer who allowed public speculation
about his guilt to go unchallenged.”).
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“[l]awyers who ignore the media in the modern age do so at their own
peril. They risk ceding the court of public opinion to their
251
opponents.”
D. The Blagojevich Defense’s Extrajudicial Statements Under the
Suggested Guidelines
1. Explicit Limitations on Extrajudicial Advocacy. During the
months leading up to trial, the Blagojevich defense team continuously
argued in front of cameras and reporters that the FBI tapes at issue
252
should be played in their entirety. Blagojevich’s lawyers suggested
that the jury would obtain a complete understanding of the truth only
253
if they were allowed to hear the full contents of all the tapes. At
first glance, these statements may seem like a violation of the
suggested guideline disallowing the discussion of any evidence that
the defense lawyer does not have a good-faith belief will be admitted
254
Nevertheless, the lawyers explicitly refrained from
at trial.
255
discussing the contents of the missing portions of the tapes. A rule
disallowing the discussion of evidence that is unlikely to be admitted
at trial should not cover comments urging the prosecution and the
court to allow the jury to see evidence that is being withheld or
suggestions that the truth will be exposed only if certain evidence is
allowed at trial. A rule barring such statements could infringe on a
lawyer’s ability to expose abuse among police, prosecutors, and
courts, a goal that is one of the important reasons that defense
256
lawyers speak to the media.
Another extrajudicial statement in the Blagojevich case that
could raise concerns under the suggested limitations occurred when
Sam Adam Jr. addressed reporters following Alonzo Monk’s
257
testimony. Adam Jr. stated that in his opinion, Monk portrayed
himself on the stand as “a man that was saying what he needed to say
258
to get a deal.” Under the limitation preventing the discussion of
evidence that the lawyer does not have a good-faith belief would be

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Zack, supra note 142, at v.
See supra text accompanying notes 90–99.
See supra text accompanying notes 92, 98.
See supra text accompanying note 226.
See supra text accompanying note 99.
See supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 103–105.
Blagojevich Attorney: Monk “Couldn’t Name One Deal . . . Nothing!,” supra note 105.
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admitted at trial, this statement would likely be allowed if, on crossexamination, the defense lawyers questioned Monk about any plea
259
agreement that might have caused him to deliver biased testimony.
During the cross-examination in the courtroom, Adam Jr. did
confront Monk about his plea deal and at one point even said,
260
“You’re making that up so you can get your two years.” Because of
this questioning, Adam Jr.’s later statements to the press referred to
evidence already in front of the jury and were therefore appropriate
outside of the courtroom. The fact that Adam Jr. discussed his own
opinion of Monk’s credibility, rather than simply stating that Monk
was testifying as a part of a plea agreement, could raise additional
261
concerns, but it would not likely be enough to result in sanctions
under this particular rule.
Although the suggested limitations on defense lawyers’
extrajudicial advocacy would probably not result in sanctions in either
of these two situations, the statements made by the defense team
following the close of the Blagojevich trial raise a much more serious
concern. After the government announced its intention to retry the
262
counts on which the jury was unable to reach a consensus,
Blagojevich’s lawyers publicly lashed out at the prosecution and told
reporters that it would cost between $20 and $30 million to retry the
case—an absurd amount, in their opinion, given that the government
263
had not proven its case the first time. Making such an allegation in
259. See United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 535 (9th Cir. 1980) (“Evidence that a
witness is testifying pursuant to a plea agreement is usually admissible to show bias.”); see also
United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984) (“Bias may be induced by a witness’ like, dislike,
or fear of a party, or by the witness’ self-interest.” (emphasis added)).
260. Bob Secter, Monk’s Testimony Ends After Grilling from Adam, CHI. TRIB.
BLAGOJEVICH ON TRIAL BLOG (June 15, 2010, 12:42 PM), http://newsblogs.chicagotribune
.com/blagojevich-on-trial/2010/06/monks-testimoney-ends-after-grilling-from-adam.html.
261. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985) (“Defense counsel, like the
prosecutor, must refrain from interjecting personal beliefs into the presentation of his case.”);
United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 1978) (“An attorney may not express his
own opinion as to the credibility of witnesses.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e)
(2010) (“A lawyer shall not . . . state a personal opinion as to . . . the credibility of a
witness . . . .”). A similar concern could arise if a defense attorney made “unfounded and
inflammatory attacks on the opposing advocate” in the media. Young, 470 U.S. at 9. Although
this Note does not suggest that defense lawyers’ extrajudicial advocacy should be limited to the
type of statements that are allowed in court, it may be good strategy for defense lawyers to
avoid framing their statements in terms of their own personal opinions.
262. After the first trial, the jury convicted Blagojevich of one count of lying to the FBI out
of twenty-four total counts. Natasha Korecki, $30M? Feds Rip Blago Lawyers on Cost of Retrial,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 15, 2010, at 4.
263. See supra notes 119–122.
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the media is a likely violation of the suggested provision requiring
defense lawyers to have a good-faith belief that the statements they
264
make are factually correct. In a brief responding to a defense
motion for a judgment of acquittal following the trial, the prosecution
criticized the defense lawyers’ comments regarding the cost of retrial,
noting that the $30 million calculation was false and was simply made
265
up to improperly influence the next jury and the public. The
prosecution argued that “[i]naccurate statements concerning the costs
of retrial [are] part of a pattern in which the defense simply makes up
numbers they think will support the particular point they want to
make, regardless of whether those numbers are grounded in
266
reality.” If an assessment by a disciplinary commission were to
reveal that the prosecution’s arguments were accurate, sanctions
would then be appropriate. Making blatantly false statements in the
court of public opinion does nothing to further a client’s interests or
to ensure the legitimacy of the legal system.
2. Trial Strategy. The suggested guidelines for defense attorneys’
extrajudicial speech leave room for lawyers to make their own caseby-case determinations about the type of out-of-court advocacy that
267
would be most effective in their individual clients’ cases. For
example, Blagojevich’s lawyers made an early decision to promise
that their client would take the stand to fill any gaps in the FBI tapes
268
and to explain the portions of the tapes played in court. During the
time leading up to the trial, the defense team acted as if there were no
269
question as to whether Blagojevich would testify.
As the
government’s presentation of its case neared the end, however, the
defense lawyers’ promise became questionable, and ultimately the
270
defense rested its case without calling a single witness. Although the
lawyers’ premature statements in the media could be termed
misleading, they do not reach the point of being unethical. Instead,

264. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
265. Government’s Response in Opposition to Defendant Rod Blagojevich’s Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal, Arrest of Judgment or New Trial, supra note122, at 28–29.
266. Id. at 29.
267. See supra notes 235–238 and accompanying text.
268. See supra text accompanying note 100.
269. See supra text accompanying note 100.
270. Mike Robinson & Michael Tarm, Defense Rests in Blagojevich Trial: Rod Blagojevich
Will NOT Testify, HUFFINGTON POST (July 21, 2010, 6:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/07/21/defense-rests-in-blagojev_n_654114.html.
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under the proposed rules, decisions about whether to make
statements of this nature are left to the discretion of defense lawyers
and, ultimately, their clients.
Defense lawyers may disagree about whether making an early
promise that a client will take the stand constitutes sound trial
strategy. Blagojevich’s lawyers were able to argue that the
prosecution had not met its burden of proof, and because of that, that
271
their client had nothing to refute. But it is also likely that the
272
lawyers viewed any testimony from Blagojevich as too big of a risk.
The jury convicted Blagojevich of just one out of twenty-four counts,
but if the result had been different, commentators might have
deemed the defense’s promise bad strategy. They might have argued
that the jurors came in with an expectation to hear directly from
Blagojevich and left feeling unsatisfied with the defense. Judgments
about strategy are made easily once a trial is over, but defense
lawyers must be careful to assess the risks of their public statements
in advance. With a standard including fewer restrictions on their
statements in the media, defense attorneys would need to ensure that
any extrajudicial statement is made in good faith and with a client’s
interests in mind.
CONCLUSION
Blagojevich’s defense attorneys demonstrated to the public that
zealous representation of their client did not begin and end with their
presentation of his case in court. At points throughout the pretrial
process and during the trial itself, the defense team risked sanctions
to advocate on behalf of their client in the court of public opinion.
Surely these lawyers are not alone in their view that advocacy in the
media is an important part of representing a criminal defendant. Rule
3.6, however, provides insufficient guidance on the limitations on this
type of advocacy. Without a revision to the rule, defense lawyers like
those representing Blagojevich can use its lack of enforceability as an
open door to make arguments in the media that undermine the
legitimacy of the judicial process and risk damaging their own clients’

271. See supra text accompanying note 115.
272. See Jeff Coen & Stacy St. Clair, Why Blagojevich Broke Vow To Testify at Trial, CHI.
BREAKING NEWS CTR. (July 22, 2010, 6:40 AM), http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/2010/07/
why-blagojevich-broke-vow-to-testify-at-trial.html (“[S]ources said the defense team was
worried the former governor could be headed toward a beating on the stand that would only
undermine his case and weaken his standing with the jury.”).
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cases. Other lawyers will continue to see this lack of guidance as a
barrier to advocacy outside the courtroom and will remain silent even
when their clients need someone to speak on their behalf. The
development of a separate ethical rule focused on defense lawyers’
unique role in the justice system would provide lawyers with clear
guidelines on extrajudicial advocacy and would provide all defense
attorneys with an equal opportunity to speak to the media. Such a
rule would also give disciplinary authorities the ability to impose
sanctions in a principled way when lawyers use the media to
undermine the dignity of the legal system. Although it may be
difficult to strike the proper balance between lawyers’ First
Amendment rights and the need to preserve the legitimacy of the trial
273
process in developing a trial-publicity rule, the rule writers must
shift their focus to ensure that these appropriate interests are on the
scale.

273. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 1 (2010) (“It is difficult to strike a
balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free
expression.”).

